12. Id. at 21. 13. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § § 2000a-h (1964) . Through a total of eleven titles, the Civil Rights Act sought to insure the free exercise of rights in the areas of voting, public accommodations, education, publicly owned or operated facilities, federally financed projects and employment. Title VII, dealing with employment, the longest and most complex In the act, aimed at eradicating the form of discrimination most noxious to individuals and society. See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 Brooklyn L. Rev. 62 (1964) . See generally Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 232 (1965) ; Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 684, 688-96 (1965) ; Note, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 778 (1965) .
14. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2579 Rec. , 2583 Rec. (1964 . Representative Rivers of South Carolina fairly summarized the arguments of nine southern colleagues by praising the amendment for "making it possible for the white Christian woman to receive the same consitleration for employment as the colored woman. It is incredible to me that the authors of this monstrosity [the Civil Rights Act of 19641-whomever they are-would deprive the white woman of mostly Anglo-Saxon or Christian heritage equal opportunity before the employer. I know this Congress will not be a party to such an evil." Id. at 2583.
15. Representative Celler, chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary and a leading supporter of the Civil Rights Bill, opposed the amendment on these grounds, id. at 2577-78, as did Representative Edith Green, who sponsored the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 2720.
16. See id. at 2581-82. Representative Green pointed out, moreover, that some who strongly supported the sex amendment had opposed passage of the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 2591. In addition, ten southern representatives who spoke in favor of the sex amendment eventually No member of the House approached either committee to offer such a provision, nor did any civic or governmental organization petition the Congress to enact such legislation. 18 In fact, the President's Commission on the Status of '"'omen, in rejecting a suggestion of its Committee on Civil and Political Rights, not only declined to recommend such congressional action but termed legislation of broad application and enforcement unrealistic.' 9 The legislative history of the sex amendment reveals no clear congressional purpose or intent. Rather, it indicates dubious motivation, lack of intelligent study, and absence of direction.
20

B. Provisions
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes a blanket prohibition of discrimination based on sex, which now renders it: an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis- 20. An editorial from the New York Herald Tribune for February 10, 1964, which Representative looney entered into the Congressional Record, characterized the legislative history of the sex amendment as follows: "The goal of the clause is worthy. It came, however, as an unplanned byproduct of a confused debate, in which the implications could not be studied with the care they deserved. The issue was raised for mischievous reasons, and it may well have unhappy effects." 110 Cong. Rec. 2706 Rec. (1964 The EEOC is authorized to receive complaints from aggrieved parties, to investigate charges of discrimination and to attempt the settlement of valid complaints through the informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. 25 Title VII, however, does not authorize the EEOC to initiate litigation, so the burden of enforcement lies upon aggrieved individuals. A party who believes himself the victim of unlawful discrimination may sue in a federal district court, after initial recourse to the EEOC for informal relief, 20 Supp. 184, 187-88 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) . 27. See ibid. The Werthan Bag case held, moreover, that an aggrieved party might intervene in a class action brought by a fellow employee for injunctive relief against an employer allegedly practicing racial discrimination, even though the plaintiff had not exhausted the EEOC remedies. The court declared that the purpose of requiring preliminary resort to the Commission remedies is not to screen frivolous complaints from the courts but to "give a discriminator opportunity to respond to persuasion rather than coercion .... " Id. at 188. The right of an aggrieved party to bring an action under title VII is apparently not contingent upon an EEOC finding of discrimination. See 110 Cong. Rec. 14191 (1964) (remarks of Senator Javits).
The Attorney General has standing to bring an action whenever he has'reasonable cause to believe that any person or group is engaging in a pattern of discrimination or a practice of resistance to title VII. Civil Rights Act § 707(a), 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964 Court has never declared employment discrimination based on sex to be unconstitutional. The Court, on the other hand, has consistently upheld the constitutionality of state legislation restricting the labor of women, even though such legislation did not apply equally to men.
34
Protective labor legislation first appeared around the turn of the century when abusive employment practices resulting from the industrial revolution stirred the nation's humanitarian concern. 35 These labor statutes, which regulate terms and conditions of employment, often apply to both men and women. (1) (1964) . To avoid conflict, the EEOC has ruled that the standard of equal pay for equal work prescribed by the Equal Pay Act applies to the interpretation of title VII and that employees not covered by the Equal Pay Act but within the coverage of title VII are thereby insured the right to equal pay. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7(a) (1966) . The EEOC has also indicated its intent to adopt and apply relevant interpretations of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor to equal pay complaints filed under title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7(b)-(c) (1966 
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in any one day. Declaring that it took "judicial cognizance" of such "matters of general knowledge" 38 as women's inferior capacity in the struggle for subsistence resulting from her delicate physical structure and performance of maternal functions, 39 the Court reasoned that the maternal and familial functions of women, together with their unequal bargaining position in the labor market, provide rational bases for discriminating between the sexes in the incidence of protective labor legislation. 46 upheld the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting the licensing of women bartenders unless they be the wife or daughter of the establishment's owner. After declaring that the fourteenth amendment disallows discrimination by sex only where such discrimination is without basis in reason, the Court held that the disputed statute entailed no "irrational discrimination" despite its unequal application even among women. 47 Though state law may reasonably restrict the employment of women in the sale of alcoholic beverages, wives and daughters of tavern owners, the Court surmised, faced lesser perils from the traffic of liquor than their unprotected coworkers. In his dissent to Goesaert, Mr. Justice Rutledge stated that the controverted statute envisaged a classification which was invidious. Id. at 468. While noting that the equal protection clause demands neither "'abstract symmetry'" nor "'mathematical nicety,'" Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out that under the proposed statute wives or daughters of an owner might be licensed as bartenders, though the owner remain always absent from the premises. A woman not so related to the owner, on the other hand, would be denied a license, though male supervision be always on hand. Id. at 467-68 (dissenting opinion).
During the House debate on title VII, the Goesaert opinion met sharp criticism from Representative Martha Griffiths, who termed it "the most vulgar and insulting of decisions handed down in this century by the Supreme Court, notable for its lack of legal learning as well as for its arrogant prejudice . . . ." 110 Cong. Rec. 2580 Rec. (1964 . In particular, Rep-[Vol. 35
SEX DISCRIMINATION
Since the Muller v. Oregon 49 decision, protective labor legislation for women has attained considerable volume and extent. Today, some form of such legislation appears on the books of all fifty states and the District of Columbia.* Most commonly, these statutes prescribe the maximum hours during which women may be employed daily and weekly. 51 Other provisions establish minimum wages for female workers 5 2 or prohibit certain hazardous and strenuous forms of work. 53 In certain instances, these statutes require separate facilities for women 54 or provide maternity or special health benefits.,, Such protective legislation, though beneficially intended, contains dear discriminatory potential. An employer, for example, faced with both a male and a female applicant for the identical position and aware of the higher labor standards legally applicable to women, might understandably disregard an imbalance in merit or capacity and hire the less-qualified male.
B. Discrimination under Title VII
The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
The fate of title VH's prohibition of sex discrimination hinges on interpretation of the "bona fide occupational qualification." An unduly liberal construction of this exception would nullify the amendment altogether. Too rigid an interpretation, on the other hand, might entail an "uncritical and unintended application of the principle of equality of the sexes in employment." 5 0
While title VII plainly dictates the elimination of arbitrary discrimination between the sexes in employment practices, its practical application appears problematic. It threatens to disrupt policies established by tradition or required by state legislation or collective bargaining agreements. 57 Common sense and sympathetic understanding of the position and needs of women workers must resentative Griffiths questioned the sense of legal realism which led the majority to declare that "'the Constitution does not require a legislature to reflect sociological insight or shifting social standards any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards. '" 110 Cong. Rec. 2580 (1964 , quoting from Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 US. 464, 466 (1948 
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW therefore guide interpretation of this statute. Though devoid of quasi-legislative power over substantive rights and obligations, the EEOC has authority to issue procedural regulations to assist the implementation of title VII.68 Under title VII, moreover, good faith reliance on a formal EEOC interpretation or opinion constitutes a defense to a charge of unlawful discrimination. 0 An examination of the current EEOC rulings may, therefore, prove illuminative.
The bona fide occupational qualification clause, in the opinion of the EEOC, should receive narrow construction according to the rule normally applied to statutory exceptions. 60 Although the EEOC has avoided the enumeration of positive conditions under which sex becomes a legitimate occupational qualification, it has listed certain factors which, in its opinion, fail to constitute acceptable grounds for claiming the exception. Under these rulings the following reasons for discriminating between the sexes in employment policies are invalid: the necessity of supplying separate facilities, 6 ' assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of the sexes, 62 stereotyped characterizations and general attributes of the sexes,6 and preferences of employers, coworkers or clients.
6 4 Thus, a refusal to hire a woman on the general assumption that the incidence of turnover among female workers exceeds the male rate would constitute an unlawful employment practice under the EEOC guidelines. Likewise, failure to employ women in marketing positions in the belief that they are less capable than men of aggressive salesmanship would be unlawfully discriminatory because it is based on a "stereotyped characterization." The present EEOC rulings do, however, indicate that the requirements of authenticity or genuineness may provide acceptable bases for asserting sex as a bona fide occupational qualification. 6 5 Sex will, for example, be a legitimate occupational qualification for a clothes model or a theatrical player.
The EEOC has itself recognized that "an overly literal interpretation of the prohibition [of sex discrimination] might disrupt longstanding employment practices... without achieving compensating benefits in progress towards equal opportunity.1 66 However, the EEOC's declared intent to allow the bona fide occupational qualification only narrow construction, and its present rulings, which apparently allow sex as an occupational qualification only in cases of strict necessity, portend a rigid application of title VII. A test case now pending before the EEOC illustrates the problems involved. A complainant-union charges that the practice of certain airlines in hiring exclusively female flight attendants violates title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination. [Vol. 35 necessity nor wholly arbitrary or irrational discrimination motivate this exclusive hiring policy. None of the duties of a flight attendant are beyond male capacities, yet the understandable belief that feminine pulchritude and charm are invaluable assets in the attraction and service of passengers undoubtedly dictates this hiring practice. 68 The current EEOC guidelines, however, would apparently condemn such a personnel policy on the grounds that general sex attributes and preferences of customers are inappropriate bases for a bona fide occupational qualification. On the other hand, if an airline is entitled to offer a certain atmosphere to its passengers as a legitimately ancillary service, 69 a contention that the hiring of female flight attendants is reasonably necessary to normal business operations might not be wholly untenable.
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The stewardess case illustrates the subtleties involved in defining the limits of a bona fide occupational qualification based on sex in situations where differentiation by sex is neither necessary nor arbitrary but, in varying degrees, reasonable. Clearly, definition of those limits must follow a course of case by case determination, as the EEOC has recognized.
71
Discrimination against women in the selection of executive trainees presents a crucial problem in the application and enforcement of title VII. Industry would apparently contend that women of marriageable age represent a far greater turnover risk than men and that the inclusion of women in executive training programs, which are maintained at considerable expense, involves an unreasonable risk of lost investment.
7 2 Sound investment in executive training, industry might argue, is "reasonably necessary" to the normal functioning of any large business, and sex is, therefore, a bona fide occupational qualification of executive trainees. The EEOC, through its chairman, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., has declared an uncompromising position against this form of discrimination against women on the ground that it initiates discrimination 18, 1965, in CCH Employment Practices Guide f 8034, at 6056, in which an employer's requirement that cocktail waitresses be "sexy and exciting" was held not to violate a state statute that prohibited age discrimination. Owners of cocktail lounges, the Board reasoned, are entitled to offer the public atmosphere in addition to food and alcoholic beverages. Since "atmosphere" may include the sex appeal of waitresses, the Board concluded that legitimate business reasons required that waitresses should meet certain standards of physical attractiveness. Although older women as a class might find these conditions difficult to meet, the owners' requirement was held to be not strictly an age requirement but a nondiscriminatory occupational qualification. 
1967]
which will continue throughout their careers since top executives are usually selected from these training programs. 73 Thus, in a situation where industry argues a reasonable necessity for sex discrimination, women rightfully demand equal opportunity under title VII. The abstract guidelines announced by the EEOC, it is submitted, cannot forecast the solution of such a dilemma as satisfactorily as a pragmatic attempt to balance the interests of industry with the concrete needs and position of women workers. In a specific case, therefore, an employer asserting sex as a bona fide occupational qualification for an executive training program should be required to demonstrate that acceptance of a particular, qualified female candidate imposes a risk of investment loss sufficiently onerous to justify the exception to title V1I.
74
One test proposed as a guide in interpreting the bona fide occupational qualification is the standard of reasonable discrimination applied to protective legislation for women to determine its validity under the equal protection clause.
75 By this criterion, an employer might legitimately assert an exception to title VII whenever he could demonstrate some basis in reason for discriminating between the sexes. Applied to discrimination in executive training programs, for example, this test might allow exclusion of women by a mere showing of some risk of lost investment. The exception might be denied, moreover, only where discrimination by sex involves "irrational discrimination" as prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
76 Such an approach, however, seems adverse to the spirit of title VII. The wide abstractions of the fourteenth amendment, moreover, provide entirely too amorphous a test 77 to solve the complex problems of employment discrimination based on sex.
73. Ibid. The President's Commission also deplores the existence of this form of discrimination. Private Employment 39.
74. To require a particular employer to show that acceptance of an individual female represents a risk of investment loss sufficient to excuse compliance with title VII may seem stringent. A woman charging discrimination in the selection of executive trainees, however, might well be under an insurmountable burden. To obtain equitable relief under title VII an aggrieved party must show that an employer "intentionally engaged" in unlawful discrimination. Civil Rights Act § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964) . In view of the uniformly high qualifications of candidates and the subtleties of selection involved in such training programs, proof of intentional sex discrimination might be virtually impossible. Admission of statistical evidence of discrimination might, however, mollify a plaintiff's task. But see Civil Rights Act § 703(j), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (1964), which states that no employer shall be required to grant any individual or group preferential treatment on account of an imbalance in the number or percentage of employees of one sex already employed.
75 
Conflict with Protective Labor Legislation
The EEOC, in the publication of its guidelines, noted the probability of conflict between title VII and protective labor legislation for women.
78 Under its present guidelines, an employer may assert a bona fide occupational qualification whenever a state law prohibits women from engaging in a particular form of work. 79 The Commission has stressed, however, that only statutes that provide protection from hazards reasonably to be apprehended will qualify for the exception° and that no law whose clear effect is discriminatory rather than protective will constitute a valid basis for the statutory exception. 8 Moreover, the EEOC requires that an employer asserting a bona fide occupational qualification by reason of a protective statute shall have attempted, in good faith, to obtain from the appropriate state agency such administrative exceptions as might be available. 239-40 (1965) .
The Committee on Protective Legislation of the President's Commission, however, found the record of these protective statutes impressive and attributed to them partial responsibility for the advances made in employment opportunities for women. During the past fifty years, for example, the average real wages of working women have more than doubled, increasing at about a 10% faster rate than the earnings of men. Protective Legislation 1-2. them. Provisions once adopted for valid protective reasons may now be obsolete in a technological economy which continually expands the role of the female worker. 84 Hence, the practical effect of such outmoded laws may be "not so much to protect as to disadvantage." 85 ' Already, the EEOC has received a volume of complaints charging unlawful discrimination under these protective labor statutes. The complainant in one such case charged a discriminatory denial of opportunities for premium overtime pay. The respondent-employer claimed justification under a provision of the California Labor Code which prohibits women from working in excess of eight hours daily or forty-eight hours weekly. 86 No finding appeared, moreover, that overtime work posed any threat to the complainant's well-being.
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The case appears to present the conflict between title VII and protective labor legislation for women in total and unresolvable form. Accordingly, the EEOC has issued a special advisement declaring its intent, upon recurrence of this conflict, to advise complainants to sue in federal court to obtain a judicial determination of the disputed state law's validity in light of title VII.
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In Reynolds v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 89 the Arizona Civil Rights Commission issued an opinion declaring that protective legislation which conflicts with title VII's spirit of equality of opportunity should yield to the federal law." The complainant in the Reynolds case applied for the position of plant dispatcher, which had a higher wage rate than her position as a plant reports clerk. The employer-respondent admitted the complainant's qualifications for the position but defended its refusal to consider her on the grounds of a statute prohibiting the employment of women in excess of eight hours daily or forty-eight hours weekly 9 1 The employer granted, moreover, that the complainant could work the required extra hours without danger to her health or welfare. On these facts, the Arizona Civil Rights Commission found that the protective statute discriminates against women on the basis of their sex and that the respondent had violated the newly enacted state Civil Rights Act. 02 Thus, title VII may supersede much of the present labor legislation for women that is discriminatory rather than protective. § 2000e-7 (1964) . But see, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 296.020 (8) [Vol. 35 the validity of state protective laws under title VII, it has been suggested, may also initiate relitigation of the constitutionality of discrimination by sex in the incidence of protective labor legislation.9 4 To predict Supreme Court declaration of the unconstitutionality of protective labor legislation for women, however, contradicts established precedent. The constitutional requirements of equal protection do not require the legislative authority to extend its regulation to all possible cases, unless the unequal application of a particular statute constitutes an arbitrary discrimination.
Application of a maximum hours law to Negro women but not to white women, for example, would arbitrarily discriminate because racial difference is not a reasonable basis for unequal application of such a protective measure. The performance of maternal and familial functions, the Supreme Court has frequently held, provides a reasonable basis for differentiation between the sexes in the application of protective legislation. 96 Although some of these laws may suffer from the defect of outmoded utility, the possibility that superior protective measures might be devised would not necessarily render a particular statute unconstitutional.9T Should title VII be held generally to supersede protective statutes for women, relitigation of their constitutionality, moreover, would become superfluous.
The possibility that protective labor legislation applicable solely to women may be struck down is not, however, wholly remote. In many instances, the rational relationship between such legislation and the actual protection of maternal and familial functions appears tenuous. 
III. CONCLUSION
Despite its novelty and confused congressional history, the sex amendment to title VII may yet prove a beneficial piece of legislation.
1 0 3 If so, the courts must interpret the bona fide occupational qualification with reasonable flexibility. This exigency, it is suggested, demands revision of the present EEOC guidelines to allow reliance on such reasonable psychological factors as general sex attributes and client preferences in the determination of personnel policy where differentiation by sex is neither arbitrary nor oppressive. Finally, suits challenging the validity of state laws under title VII may spur legislative action to upgrade and standardize protective labor legislation' 0 4 and may even terminate in a Supreme Court statement of the principle of equality of opportunity for both sexes. 
